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WHEREFORE THE LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
"REVOLUTION"?-SOME COMMENTS
Chariesj. Goetzt
It would be impossible to deny that very great changes, rising even
to the level of a "revolution," have occurred in landlord-tenant law dur-
ing the past two decades. The realization that revolutionary changes
arguably have occurred in almost all branches of law during that same
period, however, dampens some of the impact of that observation. Nev-
ertheless, landlord-tenant law seems to have undergone exceptional fer-
ment. Why should this have been the case? Have the changes been
sensible?
My own answers to the two preceding questions are not entirely
incompatible with those of Professor Rabin, but they differ somewhat in
focus and emphasis. My sense of what has transpired is admittedly
handicapped by a relative newcomer's lack of breadth in legal scholar-
ship and, more specifically, by a linkage to a shadow that has ne'er dark-
ened the door of a property classroom. The things that piqued my
interest, however, could be organized around three main themes: (1) the
extent to which developments in landlord-tenant law only mirror the
contemporaneous doctrinal metamorphosis of other areas such as con-
tracts and torts; (2) the significance of, and rationale for, landlord-ten-
ant law's traditional insulation from principles applied in other
substantive areas of law; and (3) the role of landlord-tenant law in effi-
ciently implementing social goals that, although arguably wrongheaded
or counterproductive, are entrenched in the legal landscape. Viewing
the recent developments in landlord-tenant law from those perspectives,
I found little to be surprised at and less to be alarmed at than otherwise
might seem warranted.
Although property law historically has been encrusted with a mul-
titude of peculiar institutional and doctrinal features, most of property
law nevertheless fits the underlying general mold of either applied con-
tract law or applied tort law. In contract and tort, special rules have
been carved out to fit the peculiar requirements of identifiable subsets of
transactions and circumstances. To the extent that landlord-tenant
rules differ from those of "ordinary" tort and contract, one is entitled to
ask what special circumstances justify the divergence. At times, we may
expect to find that the force of those circumstances has weakened either
t Joseph M. Hartfield Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1961, Providence;
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because the circumstances are no longer as compelling or because inter-
vening doctrinal or empirical developments counterbalance the original
rationale. In short, special provisions that may have made sense in the
past no longer do so, either because the world has changed or because
we have altered our understanding of how best to work with new
circumstances.
It would be nice to think that exceptional rules are constantly being
reevaluated by courts and legislatures so that, if they ever outlive their
usefulness, prompt abandonment would follow. A more realistic view,
however, concedes that, as in physics, there exists an inertial impedi-
ment to be overcome.' On this theory, changes will tend not to be
smooth and continuous. Rather, the changes will require overcoming
certain "threshold" levels of incongruence or necessitate the occurrence
of "triggering" events. Either of these phenomena is capable of motivat-
ing a thorough reassessment-and possible rejection-of traditional le-
gal rules that had long been accepted almost uncritically.
In attempting to explain what has happened, Professor Rabin
looks, in significant measure, toward what might be termed "exoge-
nous" factors, i.e., developments outside of the narrow confines of the
judicial process and legal scholarship. In particular, he attaches consid-
erable importance to sociological factors, such as the civil rights move-
ment and the Vietnam War, as inertia-breaking events. Although I do
not reject entirely the influence of such factors, I am inclined to look
more closely for "endogenous" explanations. Accordingly, it seems sen-
sible to begin by exploring briefly the extent to which the revolution in
landlord-tenant law is explicable as (1) a special case of forces operating
more generally in law over the past few decades, and (2) a breakdown of
some of the empirical considerations that might once have justifiably
insulated property law from other substantive areas of law.
In evaluating shifts in the general rule structure of law and the
abandonment of the exceptions to that general structure, it is important
to have in mind some functional theory of optimal rules and exceptions.
One helpful aspect of modern law and economics scholarship has been
to articulate, in more rigorous, explicit and, hopefully more intelligible
form, rationales for legal doctrines that arose long before the law and
economics movement. Thus, recent scholarship is increasingly explicit
about the role of legal rules as allocators of risks. In contract, the legal
rules provide a "preformulated" set of risk allocations that the parties
can-generally, but not always-alter by entering into "particularized"
1 One of my own first forays into legal scholarship dealt with a rule, the penalties doc-
trine, that apparently had a defensible rationale historically but which in my opinion has
long been anachronistic. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensa-




mutual agreements. 2 In tort, the legally supplied risk allocations are
frequently more difficult to alter consensually because of such factors as
high transactions costs, the difficulty of identifying the potential parties,
and third-party effects. Whatever the underlying branch of substantive
law, this approach leads to the thesis that the legal system should estab-
lish rules that allocate risks efficiently, because subsequent reallocation
is always costly and sometimes impracticably difficult.
Exceptions to the general rules ought to be explicable either in
terms of some historical fortuity or in terms of some set of circumstances
that reverses the "ordinary" presumption of efficient allocation of risks.
As I understand it, much of the insulation of leases from contract law is
probably traceable to the need to maintain the legal fiction of a "lease"
at a time when the outright sale of portions of feudal estates in the form
of freeholds would have been subject to disadvantageous legal treat-
ment. For a time, therefore, the law would have been doing no more
than piercing a formal veil to arrive at the underlying reality when it
treated real estate leases, usually of very long term, as "conveyances"
rather than normal contracts for a package of goods and services. At
that time, the "lessee" had in most economically relevant senses the
powers of ownership, and thus, when viewed in their original environ-
ment, the archaic rules make a great deal of sense. The problem with
this explanation is that it loses most of its relevance by the eighteenth
century. Why then did landlord-tenant risk allocations take several cen-
turies to readjust?
One possible explanation is that there are many risks for which the
tenant is arguably at least as good a risk-bearer as the landlord. With
respect to certain risks, the tenant has advantages as to information and
immediate access or "control." Also, the costs of moral hazard that do
not rise to the level ofprovable contributory negligence may be extremely
significant. With respect to such risks, there would be no sound eco-
nomic motivation to change the traditional allocation of responsibility
to the tenant. This reasoning applies when the tenant is as good a risk-
bearer as the landlord, and not merely when the tenant enjoys a clear
comparative advantage. Even if we can identify in theory the factors
that ought to give one party or the other a systematic advantage, there
are practical difficulties in discriminating, whether through a rule or a
lease provision, among classes of risks that will be borne by each party.
On the other hand, both theoretical and practical considerations
suggest a number of broad classes of risk where the landlord will gener-
ally enjoy a cost advantage. Some of these are obvious: for example,
concealed risks that the landlord is aware of but the tenant is incapable
of avoiding or mitigating. Although it would be impractical to supply
2 See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle. Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obliga-
tion, 69 VA. L. REv. 967 (1983).
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an exhaustive list of areas of presumptive landlord superiority, two
should be mentioned here because their empirical importance probably
has increased dramatically in the course of the twentieth century.
One of these areas involves the question of responsibility for so-
called common areas. Investment in common areas by tenants is a class-
ical case of what recent scholarship has labeled the "free rider problem."
A tenant's willingness to alleviate a potentially tortious hazard or to
maintain facilities ancillary to the full enjoyment of contractual benefits
will be infected by the realization that such investments, although cost-
effective for the tenant group collectively, are usually not optimal for the
individual. The importance of large, multifamily apartment complexes
has increased enormously in the past few decades. Such facilities are, of
course, a classical environment for free rider and other interdependency-
externality problems that can be more efficiently managed by a central-
ized coordinator, the landlord, than by individual tenants.
There is an analogous but less widely recognized problem related to
the increasing brevity of leases and high turnover rates of tenants. Con-
sider, for instance, a potential tort hazard such as ceiling light wiring
that has developed brittle and increasingly dangerous insulation. If the
responsibility for repair were allocated to the tenant, the tenant would
presumably weigh the cost of the repair against the expected value of
the harm avoided during the period of his tenan. Because only the very
small fraction of the benefits that accrues during the repairer's own ten-
ancy will "count" in the individual tenant's cost-benefit calculus, pre-
sumably tenants will fail to make many efficient maintenance and
hazard-reduction expenditures. Worse yet, unless the terms of the lease
preclude it, the defect may be "fixed" by the tenant in a manner that is
cost-effective for a single lease term, but for the long-term actually raises
the cost of dealing with the situation.
High turnover rates in leased properties exacerbate this problem.
To the extent that a tenant anticipates continuing his occupancy of the
premises, his investment planning horizon may exceed the length of
what is nominally a single-term lease. In this respect, the increased resi-
dential mobility of the past few decades is an empirical factor that may
have tipped the balance against tenant control of certain risks.
It would be difficult to resist the claim that the common law rules
applicable to innkeepers support an early recognition of the practical
importance of shared facilities within multiple-dwelling houses and of
short-term tenancy as key factors in determining appropriate landlord-
tenant responsibilities. The same historical exigencies that impacted
real estate cases did not affect the innkeeper-guest rules. Hence, those
rules developed freely along more orthodox tort and contract lines.
Even the early common law courts placed more substantial obligations
upon innkeepers than landlords, a point that several of the leadingjudi-
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cial opinions have recognized during the recent "revolution."' 3 The
courts have explicitly recognized only the common property factor and
do not discuss the importance of the planning horizon. In terms of the
conceptual structures used in recent scholarship, these problems share
common theoretical bases.
The foregoing discussion outlined some reasons why traditional
landlord-tenant law might be said to have been incongruent with an
efficient set of risk-allocating rules. Furthermore, empirical develop-
ments in housing patterns suggest that this incongruence should have
increased with the passage of time. Because there were arguably good
reasons to motivate a change, the puzzle is why such a dramatic break-
through occurred right after the middle of the twentieth century.
The axiom that "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" is a familiar one but,
based on what has been said above, seemingly inapposite. On second
thought, however, a corollary might be that "If bein' broke don't do no
harm, it really ain't broke." Until recently, special lease provisions have
always been a vehicle for reallocating most of the risks of the landlord-
tenant relationship. Because most real property transactions already in-
volve a detailed formal written contract, specifically reallocating risks
entails negligible additional cost. I have always found amusing an
anachronistic Virginia common law rule that places the risk of loss
before formal transfer of title and possession on the purchaser of real
property, notwithstanding strong a priori reasons to believe that the
seller, while he retains possession and control, is normally a more effi-
cient bearer of such risks. Consequently, every contract of purchase exe-
cuted in Virginia incorporates a one-line proviso that "[a]ll risk of loss or
damage to the property by fire, windstorm, casualty, or other cause is
assumed by Seller until possession of the property is delivered to Pur-
chaser."'4 There has certainly been no groundswell of support for aban-
donment of this clearly inefficient common law rule, presumably
because a particularized rejection of the preformulated rule is virtually
costless. In sum, irrationality may be acceptable as long as it costs you
nothing.
Contrast the real property situation with the practice regarding the
innkeeper-guest rules mentioned above. In principle, there is no reason
why registering at a hotel might not involve signing a lengthy contrac-
tual agreement that reallocates the duties imposed under common law.
Implementing this procedure, however, would probably be expensive,
especially in relation to the overall size of the transaction. Hence, the
3 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also An-
not., 70 A.L.R.2d 621 (1960) (discussion and collection of innkeeper's duty cases).
4 Eg, Virginia Association of Realtors, Form VAR-600, para. 8 (1977) (Virginia Asso-
ciation of Realtors Standard Form Contract of Purchase).
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pressure might well be higher-in the small-transaction transient context
for the law to "get it right" initially and thereby save the parties the
trouble of drafting particularized agreements.
One possible answer to the puzzle of why the law did not change
earlier, therefore, is that there was no need; the "actual" legal obliga-
tions written into leases presented a reasonably efficient set of risk allo-
cations, even if the black letter law did not. The result would be a
classic instance of the "Coase Theorem" at work.5 I have no empirical
evidence at hand to support this hypothesis, 6 but it would be surprising
if it were not generally true. Specifically, one would expect to find that,
much prior to the cases cited by Professor Rabin, leases commonly ex-
panded on the landlord's common law duties with respect to such issues
as repair and maintenance of common areas. Further, if this hypothesis
of substantial "contracting out" were shown to be incorrect, what
should we make of that evidence? It is, after all, widely recognized that
profit-making incentives that cause the market to adjust appropriately
tend to accompany most efficiency-enhancing arrangements.
Before going any further, I wish to disclaim any notion that the
"invisible hand" of the marketplace solves all problems, even abstract-
ing from the usual distributional qualifications. In particular, the third-
party effects of housing choices have often been recognized. Indeed, one
of the earliest practical applications of the Prisoner's Dilemma game
theoretic model was to rationalize the imposition of mandatory housing
and health codes. 7 Many housing attributes affect the value and enjoy-
ment of adjacent properties through what economists have long ana-
lyzed as "externalities." Traditional nuisance law concerns the most
egregious of the negative external effects, but it does not adequately ad-
dress either the external costs that fall short of nuisance or the failure to
provide external benefits. Hence, codes providing for mandatory mini-
mum standards are one means of addressing market-failure problems.
Such provisions would, of course, serve no purpose if individual parties
could contract out of the imposed obligations. The standards encom-
passed under this rationale, however, include only those the effects of
5 Subject to the limitations presented by transactions costs, parties will bargain their
way from a nonoptimal to an optimal set of liabilities. See Coase, The Problem of.Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
6 In the limited time available to write this comment, I was able to examine the struc-
ture of long-term (20 years plus) leases for commercial property (large office buildings) in
New York City during the mid-1950s. Unfortunately, both the circumstances and the internal
content of these leases make it plain that they fit essentially the "conveyance" mold of the old
agrarian leases. For instance, the lessee is even given the right, subject to certain review by the
lessor, to tear down the original building and replace it with a new one. Not surprisingly,
such leases explicitly confirm most of the rights and duties asserted by the traditional common
law.
7 See Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
105, 107-10 & n.5 (1961).
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which would "spill over" property lines; the landlord can effectively in-
ternalize externalities flowing among rental units subject to the control
of a single owner.
Even absent third-party or externality problems, the bargaining
process itself may be defective. Interest in problems of alleged "uncon-
scionability" or imbalance in bargaining power has increased in the last
several decades.8 Because the housing market is a competitive one, a
relative bargaining power analysis explains little about the structure of
landlord-tenant agreements. More interesting, in my view, is the hy-
pothesis of systematic information bias on the part of consumers.
One of the rationales for the recent extension of strict liability in
tort reflects a concern for information bias.9 According to this hypothe-
sis, there are identifiable classes of risky products for which consumers
systematically underestimate the associated risks. Hence, these products
are, in effect, "underpriced" and consequently overconsumed. Imposi-
tion of strict liability, the argument goes, causes producers with superior
information and experience to incorporate the correct cost of the hazard
into the product and thus give the appropriate signals to consumers.
Carried into the landlord-tenant context, a similar argument would ex-
plain the imposition of nonwaivable duties on the landlord. If these
benefits were waivable, the argument would assert, consumers would
systematically undervalue the benefits and refuse to "purchase" them by
foregoing the landlord's offer of lower rent in exchange for waiver.'0
It has been customary, as indicated above, to couch the consumer
misinformation argument in terms of misperception of objective facts
about the state of the world and the consequences (either beneficial or
detrimental) associated with certain exposures. Equally problematical
is the average layman's understanding of the real content of the legal
rights that he either retains or bargains away, especially when a mul-
tipage standard form lease is involved. Too little attention has been paid
to the issue of whether there is the equivalent of "informed consent"
and, if not, what the legal policy response should be. Recent contract
law has, in any event, provided protections to consumers affected by
8 There is voluminous legal literature on these issues. E.g., Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293 (1975); Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and
theJudicial Process, 49 IND. L.J. 367 (1974); see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
NJ. 358, 389-90, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1959) (quoting Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (1943)).
9 See Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis.: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV.
439, 463 (1972); Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and
Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 694; McKean, Products Liability: Trends and
Implications, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 3, 41-42 (1970).
10 See generally Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:
A Legal and Economic Anaysis, 27 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979) (focusing primarily on contracts,
but also summarizing and citing relevant economics literature).
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waivers or limitations of contractual liability.'"
The "information defects" rationale for the imposition of nonwaiv-
able conditions on contracts is a form of paternalism that allegedly
"saves" the consumer from what he would recognize as an "error" if he
were only smarter or better-informed. This form of paternalism is at
least conceptually consistent with the goal of conformiig the results to
the tastes and preferences of the parties concerned, subject of course to
the underlying economic constraints and trade-offs. The rationale in-
volved is basically an empirical one and is at least conceptually refuta-
ble. It is only a short step, however, from this form of paternalism to
that which rejects the preferences themselves as wrongheaded: anyone,
however well informed, who is willing to trade off rat infestation for $X
a month lower rent is an "incompetent" or "irrational" decisionmaker
and needs protection from the consequences of his own inept behavior.
This second and much stronger form of paternalism gives carte blanche
to promoters of codes, mandatory minimum standards, and nonwaiv-
able rights because there is no objective way to rebut the rationale's
main premise.
I shall not explore in any greater detail the relevant aspects of the
doctrinal ferment in contract and tort law that occurred both before
and contemporaneously with the landlord-tenant law upheaval. That
task surpasses the boundaries of this brief comment and, moreover, is
one for which others have greater expertise. The few examples given
above will nevertheless suffice to make several points that are relevant to
the restructuring of landlord-tenant law. First, new contract, tort, and
"market intervention" doctrines inevitably raised the question of their
applicability to landlord-tenant law and, impliedly, of the rationality of
the whole existing body of law. Second, some of these doctrines seemed
to support-rightly or wrongly-the refusal to enforce bargains in fact
made (e.g., waivers), and others supplied a rationale for mandatory du-
ties and other forms of interference with unfettered freedom of contract.
Fresh issues of "applicability" were raised repeatedly during the pe-
riod in question. To what extent does "unconscionability" apply to
landlord-tenant bargains? Absent any explicit agreement, who is respon-
sible for common areas in rental properties? Should strict or "no fault"
liability be applied to landlord tort duties? It is hard to imagine how
courts could answer these and dozens of other similar landlord-tenant
questions-many of which are described in Professor Rabin's survey-
without squarely confronting the rationales and arguments developed
for the same or analogous issues in other areas of substantive law.
At least implicitly, if not explicitly, developments in other branches
of law seemed to incorporate such notions as optimal risk-bearing, trans-
11 See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, -314, -316, -715, -719 (1977).
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actions costs, and externalities. Evaluating these developments for possi-
ble applicability in the landlord-tenant environment would
understandably be conducted in the same terms. Once that process be-
gan, the insularity of property law and its incongruence with the main-
stream of related twentieth-century law would also become increasingly
apparent. Hence, I hypothesize, the "crack" in the facade of traditional
property law was triggered in part by the necessity to reconcile it logi-
cally with new and vigorous developments in other related areas of law.
Once the wall had been breached, it would have become increasingly
difficult to sustain the notion that there should be a separate law of
"landlord-tenant contracts" or "landlord-tenant torts," unless the spe-
cial rules could be rationalized in terms of identifiable factors that are
peculiar to the landlord-tenant relationship, rather than to mere tradi-
tion. This would explain the pressure on other antiquated landlord-ten-
ant doctrines such as the independence of convenants, the no-
apportionment rule, and the absence of a duty of mitigation. Finally, I
am intrigued by the hypothesis that the crumbling of landlord-tenant
law's peculiar procedural structure-which, in effect, had traditionally
denied the tenant low-cost, practical self-help remedies-infused certain
tenant rights, such as a landlord's duty to repair, with real value for the
first time, 12 thus increasing the degree of practical concern over these
matters.
I am not sure to what extent, if at all, Professor Rabin would disa-
gree with any of the above, but I am not, at least on the evidence thus
far presented, disposed to let pass unchallenged what is apparently a
contention shared by a number of property commentators that land-
lord-tenant law has generally gone beyond other related branches of law.
For example, Professor Donahue, in a survey of recent landlord-tenant
developments, rejects the upheaval as attributable to the new applica-
tion of contract law principles and asks, by way of illustration, "where
do we find any counterpart [in contract law] to the implied covenant to
repair which lies at the heart of so many recent cases and legislation?"1 3
In the same vein, Professor Rabin cites the result in Kline v. 1500 Massa-
chusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. 14 apparently as an exceptional extension
of tort responsibility.
My impression is that a multitude of very similar holdings can be
found in fact situations analogous to Kline. Certainly the supposed black
letter rule that one is not responsible for the supervening criminal acts of
others has always been an oversimplification, as evidenced by the torts
12 See Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REv. 242,
245-51 (1974).
13 Id at 257-58.
14 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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casebook chestnut Hines v. Garrett, '- in which a conductor was found
liable for the rape of a woman walking back through a bad neighbor-
hood because he failed to let her off at the correct stop. Immediately
prior to the "revolution" under discussion here, in a case quite analo-
gous to Kline, a court held a tour operator liable for the unlawful action
of southern roughnecks who entered a tour bus and attacked several
black tourists. 16 In fact, other branches of tort law seem to go far be-
yond Kline in finding tort liability even where there is no identifiable
special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. Thus, in
the much-publicized Tarasoff case, a psychiatric counselor was held lia-
ble for not warning a patient's fiancee of the patient's expressed intent
to attack her.'
7
Affirmative responsibility to mitigate the wrongful acts of others is,
in essence, the same problem as the "duty to rescue."18 Although courts
have never imposed such duties as a general rule, they have always
carved out exceptions whenever they found a justifying "special rela-
tionship." The existence of a contractual relationship, such as that be-
tween landlord and tenant, arguably creates such a relationship because
the market places the landlord in a position to "charge" for the benefits
he provides to the tenant under his "protective" duty. 19 Hence, it seems
misleading to suggest that Kline is inconsistent with ordinary tort law.
In like manner, Donahue's query about the existence of an implied
duty to repair within contract law is also misleading precisely because it
states the issue in terms of a general duty. There is, of course, no general
implied duty to repair in contract (assuming that the performance ten-
dered was initially conforming). It is significant, however, that courts
will recognize such a duty in most contractual situations that are com-
parable to the landlord-tenant situation. An example that comes to
mind is that of the lease contract for a rental car. When I searched for a
recent car rental contract, I frankly expected to find an explicit war-
15 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921).
16 Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959); see also
Stachnievicz v. Mar-Can Corp., 259 Or. 583,488 P.2d 436 (1971) (duty of tavern owner to his
paying customers).
17 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 13 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976). I do not mean necessarily to suggest that Tarasoffhas been widely followed, but the
cases cited and the reasoning in the court's opinion are instructive.
18 See generally Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and A/truism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (economic model predicting
when and how law will intervene to save rescuers).
19 The importance of a bargaining relationship in the enforcement of promises is treated
in Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261,
1274-88 (1980). In this article, a misleading (unfulfilled) promise is analyzed as the effective
equivalent of a tort. See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 2 (analyzing affirmative postcontrac-
tual duty to warn).
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ranty to repair. Such was not the case.20 Most of the readers of these
comments will know from experience, however, that a de facto warranty
of that nature operates in practice throughout the rental car industry.
In the unlikely event that litigation resulted over the matter, I have no
doubt that most courts would formally imply such a warranty where it
is not expressly made. Besides creating extraordinary duties applicable
to certain subsets of transactions, contract law similarly carves out ex-
emptions from general duties, such as the duty to mitigate, 21 when spe-
cial circumstances exist.
In short, I see the dominant theme of the last twenty years as little
more than the (arguably overdue) integration of landlord-tenant law
into the mainstream of contract and tort law. What is not entirely clear
to me, however, is the extent of this integrative process. Just as there are
special subsets of contract and tort law, we might retain certain distinc-
tive rules for landlord-tenant relations. Focusing exclusively on the
"revolution" has perhaps distracted us from considering what special
rules should be retained or created in the light of the very principles that
triggered the "revolution."
Commenting briefly on some of the more infamous features of the
"revolution," although I do not findJavins and its progeny wholly in-
defensible in theory, I share with others the practical assessment that it
represents an unfortunate and mischievous policy even for those it pre-
sumably was intended to benefit. 22 I am troubled by the relevance or
probative value of much of the evidence cited by Professor Rabin. In
particular, I am puzzled by the suggestion that the "mainstream" pre-
diction of consequent worsening of housing conditions for the poorest
tenants has been empirically refuted. I would never have regarded
mainstream analysis as necessarily predicting a deterioration in absolute
20 The following is the only relevant paragraph in a Hertz Corporation Standard Form
Rental Agreement, form 1700 (3/81) (emphasis in original):
2. VEHICLE REPAIRS WARRANTY DISCLAIMER
Vehicle is Lessor's property. This agreement is a contract for the use of
the bailed vehicle only. While vehicle is on rental to Customer, Customer
is not Lessor's agent for any purpose. Any service to or replacement of a
part or accessory to Vehicle during the rental must have Lessor's prior
approval. Customer acquires no rights other than the right to use Vehicle
in accordance with this Agreement. LESSOR MAKES NO WAR-
RANTY OF ANY KIND, NATURE OR DESCRIPTION, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY VEHICLE COV-
ERED BY THIS AGREEMENT.
I do not read this provision as expressly disclaiming a duty to repair.
21 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 2.
22 See, e.g., Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysi of Housing Code
Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE LJ. 1175 (1973). But see Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and
Redistribution Poli. A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973); Ackerman, Regulat-
ing Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income
Redistribution Polic, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
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conditions, but only a shortfall from what otherwise ,would have oc-
curred, measured in welfare terms and not in the physical character of
the housing.
Even assuming arguendo thatJavins-type rules represent bad pol-
icy, it does not follow that the courts have implemented these policies
irrationally (from their own perspective). Thus, I am not perplexed by
what Professor Rabin characterizes as the misapplication of a contract-
type remedy to a fictional contract. Admittedly, the remedial approach
chosen is overcompensatory, but so are treble damages for antitrust vio-
lations. One need only view these remedies as part of a private enforce-
ment scheme to regard them as at least arguably appropriate for their
intended purpose. In spite of the new legal codes and their seemingly
harsh remedial provisions, my personal experience suggests that in many
areas landlords continue knowingly to incorporate unenforceable provi-
sions in rental agreements. To the extent that tenants are not well-in-
formed on the law, these provisions exert an in terrorem effect that
benefits landlords. Query whether such practices should also be subject
to punitive damages?
23
Finally, I agree with the broad outlines of Professor Rabin's analy-
sis of rent control and condominium conversion laws as involving little
other than the capture, by coalitions of tenants, of short-term redistribu-
tive gains through the political process. I would point out only that
similar reallocations have occurred widely throughout the United States
economy since the 1940s, both in the form of price-limiting schemes and
direct allocations. The treatment of oil and gas resources, for instance,
presents an interesting parallel.
23 1 have been unable to find any landlord-tenant cases that address this point squarely.
Similar practices, however, appear to be used by insurance companies when particular exclu-
sions have been held unenforceable by state courts. See Richards v. Allstate Ins. Co., 693 F.2d
502 (5th Cir. 1982) (awarding $375,000 in punitive damages to single plaintiff with actual
damages of $2,500).
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